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Abstract: It has been objected recently that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported 
hypothesis that unconscious perception is possible. Because epistemological disjunctivism is plausible only in 
conjunction with naïve realism (for a reason I provide), the objection reaches it too. In response, I show that the 
unconscious perception hypothesis can be changed from a problem into an advantage of epistemological 
disjunctivism. I do this by suggesting that: (i) naïve realism is consistent with the hypothesis; (ii) the contrast 
between epistemological disjunctivism and epistemic externalism explains the difference in epistemic import 
between conscious and unconscious perception. 
 
 Epistemological disjunctivism is an alternative to internalist and externalist accounts 
of perceptual justification. According to it, conscious perception P affords the subject S an 
opportunity to acquire factive and fully reflectively accessible rational support R for S's 
perceptual belief that ɸ. Had S instead experienced an hallucination H subjectively 
indistinguishable from P, whatever S's rational support for the belief that ɸ would have been, 
it would have been weaker than R. Does this claim gain or lose plausibility if coupled with 
naïve realism? On the one hand, naïve realism corroborates the epistemic difference between 
P and H by introducing a metaphysical difference between them: P is constituted by the mind-
independent object, H is not. On the other hand, the conjunction of epistemological 
disjunctivism and naïve realism inherits controversial commitments of the latter. Those, it 
might be argued, include a denial of an empirically well-supported hypothesis that 
unconscious perception is possible (Berger & Nanay, 2016; Block & Phillips, 2017). In 
response, I show that naïve realism reinforces epistemological disjunctivism with respect to 
both conscious and unconscious perception. 
 First, I spell out what I think is the best available formulation of epistemological 
disjunctivism, and explain why it is implausible without the support of naïve realism (section 
1). Second, I suggest a small tweak to the formulation of naïve realism so as to make it 
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compatible with the unconscious perception hypothesis (section 2). Third, I show that the 
contrast between epistemological disjunctivism and epistemic externalism can be used to 
account for the difference in epistemic import between conscious and unconscious perception 
(section 3). 
 
1. Epistemological disjunctivism and naïve realism 
 Epistemological disjunctivism has been delineated in various ways. Because I am 
unable to survey them all here, below I set forth only the one I prefer. That said, my approach 
to unconscious perception is, at least in principle, available on other expositions of 
epistemological disjunctivism as well. 
 When the subject S (i) consciously sees the object O, (ii) has the concept of O, and 
(iii) brings O under that concept, S sees that ɸ (where ɸ equals "That is O"). The fulfilment of 
the (i-iii) conditions suffices for perceptual knowledge because seeing that ɸ is a specific way 
of knowing that ɸ. Importantly, perceptual knowledge is recognitional, not evidential, i.e. 
perceptually knowing that ɸ consists in recognizing what one sees, not in basing the belief 
that ɸ on 'perceptual evidence'. Justification enters the picture only when S is required to 
provide a reason for her belief that ɸ. In paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge, S can 
meet this requirement because she knows that ɸ and she knows that she sees that ɸ, i.e. she is 
in possession of factive and fully reflectively accessible rational support R for her belief that 
ɸ. S's overall evidence for ɸ is not limited to the true perceptual belief "That is O", as it 
consists of the totality of S's knowledge. Still, R would be unattainable without the fulfilment 
of the (i-iii) conditions.  
 This formulation of epistemological disjunctivism can be traced in works of Alan 
Millar (see e.g. Millar, 2010), albeit Millar prefers 'traditional direct realism' over naïve 
realism (Millar, 2007). Contrary to Millar, I suggest reading the condition (i) above through 
the lens of naïve realism. Why? Consider a genuine visual perception P of the object O by the 
subject S and a corresponding hallucination H by S's counterpart S*, where H is 
indistinguishable from P by introspection alone. Naïve realism is the only currently available 
theory of perception which denies that the phenomenal characters of P and H are qualitatively 
identical. On naïve realism, the phenomenal character of P is partially constituted by O. Thus, 
only under naïve realism is what S is aware of incompatible with O not being around. 
Conversely, if naïve realism was false, what S is aware of would be consistent with O not 
being around. This, in turn, would contest the idea that P furnishes S with an opportunity to 
acquire factive and fully reflectively accessible rational support for her belief that ɸ. 
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Therefore, the plausibility of epistemological disjunctivism depends on the plausibility of 
naïve realism. 
 Craig French (French, 2016) argues that formulating epistemological disjunctivism in 
terms of seeing things instead of seeing that ɸ enables one to account for the factivity of 
perceptual justification without incurring any substantive commitments in metaphysics of 
perception. The problem is that French brackets issues concerning reflective accessibility. 
Consequently, his proposal collapses into a defence of epistemic externalism (i.e. the view 
that perceptual warrant is externally grounded, yet not fully reflectively accessible). By 
contrast, it is essential to epistemological disjunctivism that R is both factive and fully 
reflectively accessible. And when the latter condition is also taken into consideration, it turns 
out that the plausibility of epistemological disjunctivism varies widely depending on which 
theory of perception is assumed. 
  
2. Naïve realism and unconscious perception 
 Naïve realism construes perception as a direct relation between the subject and the 
mind-independent object. Perceptual relation explains both the qualitative character and the 
epistemic import of conscious perception in the following way: the properties of the mind-
independent object just are the properties that constitute the phenomenal character of 
perception (see e.g. Brewer, 2011; Campbell, 2002; Martin, 2009). 
 The critics infer from this that naïve realism renders perception as conscious by 
definition, which amounts to contradicting well-established empirical science (see e.g. Berger 
& Nanay, 2016; Block & Phillips, 2017). This poses a problem for epistemological 
disjunctivism as well: if naïve realism is rejected, (i) it becomes difficult to substantiate the 
claim that the subject can have factive and fully reflectively accessible rational support for her 
perceptual beliefs, and (ii) it is unclear how the epistemological disjunctivist could account 
for epistemic import of unconscious perception. 
 The best strategy for the naïve realist is to accept the possibility of unconscious 
perception by allowing for perceptual relations without phenomenal character. On this 
proposal, perception is relational no matter whether it is conscious or not. It is relational 
because it has the mind-independent object among its constituents. Whether being in such 
relation results in the subject being conscious of the object is a further question. The 
difference between conscious and unconscious perception can be explained in terms of their 
respective relata, namely their subjects and their objects. 
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 Although this formulation of naïve realism is certainly unorthodox, it should be noted 
that neither of the main motivations of naïve realism is undermined simply by accepting the 
unconscious perception hypothesis. Some of them, e.g. arguments from fine-grainedness 
(Brewer, 2011) and transparency (Martin, 2002) of experience, concern phenomenology of 
perception, which is something that unconscious perception lacks by definition. Hence they 
remain unaffected by the possibility of unconscious perception. By the same token, they are 
insufficient to establish naïve realism as a general theory of perception.  
 However, not all arguments for naïve realism appeal to phenomenology. Charles 
Travis' (Travis, 2013) argument to the conclusion that the idea of perceptual content is 
incoherent applies equally to both conscious and unconscious perception, thereby 
undermining the objection (see e.g. Block & Phillips, 2017; Nanay, 2014) that positing 
perceptual representations is indispensable to account for unconscious perception.  
 Another argument for naïve realism rests on the claim that the subject is not infallible 
with respect to the phenomenal character of her own experience (Martin, 2009). This point 
actually gains support from empirical evidence for unconscious perception. For such evidence 
consists of numerous cases in which subjects make incorrect judgements concerning the kind 
of mental state they are in (they report not perceiving the stimulus despite perceiving it).  
 Finally, the possibility of unconscious perception does not undermine John Campbell's 
argument that only naïve realism properly explains how perceptual consciousness makes 
demonstrative thought and reference possible (Campbell, 2002). Unconsciously perceiving O 
and employing the relevant concept is necessary but insufficient to enable the subject to 
demonstratively judge that "That is O". To suffice, perception has to be conscious. Suppose O 
is F, i.e. a kind of thing that people can perceive only unconsciously. Even if we could report 
our experiences of F-things, 'this would evidently be a case in which none of us had the 
slightest idea what we were talking about' (Campbell, 2002: 223). Still, unconscious 
perception, if it exists, presumably can and does influence the way the subject behaves, thus 
suggesting that it provides the subject with some epistemic import. 
 
3. Conscious vs. unconscious epistemic import 
 I suggest that the difference in epistemic import between conscious and unconscious 
perception should be explained in terms of the contrast between epistemological disjunctivism 
and epistemic externalism. 
 In experimental practice, the conclusion that the stimulus was perceived unconsciously 
is drawn from the observation that the subjects report no consciousness of the stimulus, and 
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yet perform a task that requires perception of the stimulus with above-chance accuracy. 
Epistemic import of unconscious perception, i.e. unconscious perceptual warrant, is what 
enables the subject to perform at this level of accuracy despite being unaware of the stimulus.  
Epistemic import of unconscious perception is thus severely limited, and can be assessed only 
post hoc, by showing that the subject's behaviour was different than it would have been had 
no perception happened. This can be understood along the lines of epistemic externalism, i.e. 
the view that perceptual warrant is externally grounded, yet not fully reflectively accessible. 
Namely, unconscious perceptual warrant is externally grounded because unconscious 
perception is relational, yet not reflectively accessible because unconscious perception lacks 
phenomenal character. 
 Does it mean that one can unconsciously see that ɸ, thereby acquiring perceptual 
knowledge that ɸ? Assuming that justification is not necessary for perceptual knowledge, 
unconscious perceptual warrant might seem sufficient. But granting this would be precipitant. 
To see why, compare three mushroom pickers: 
 
(A) John sees that there is a parasol mushroom before him, and knows that he sees that 
because he has just checked by moving the mushroom's ring back and forth on its stalk. 
(B) Henry sees that there is a parasol mushroom before him, yet he does not know that he sees 
that, for had it been a death cap, he would still have thought it is a parasol mushroom. 
(C) Ned unconsciously sees a parasol mushroom. 
 
According to the view sketched in section 1, the epistemic difference between (A) and (B) 
concerns justification. In (A), John not only knows that there is a parasol mushroom before 
him, but he can also justify his belief that this is so because he knows that he knows. In (B), 
Henry knows that there is a parasol mushroom before him because he sees what in fact is a 
parasol mushroom and correctly recognizes it as such, yet he is unable to rule out that it is a 
death cap. In (C), Ned does not know that there is a parasol mushroom before him. 
 Since Henry is epistemically lucky, ascribing knowledge to him is controversial. I 
think he knows because what he sees is what he thinks he sees, which, ceteris paribus, grants 
him a free meal. If what he sees was not what he thinks he sees (a death cap), that meal would 
cost him a liver failure. This is what distinguishes perceptually knowing from not knowing. 
That what Henry sees could have easily not been what he thinks he sees is irrelevant because 
it does not decide whether a liver transplant will be needed. 
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 Still, (C) is epistemically weaker from (A) and (B) even if Henry does not count as 
knowing. In (B), Henry behaves just like John; to distinguish between (A) and (B) we would 
have to ask John and Henry about the death cap possibility. Only then would the difference 
between their epistemic standings become evident. By contrast, if we asked Ned the same 
question, he would not even know what are we talking about, as he is unaware that there is a 
parasol mushroom in the vicinity. If Ned was a real mushroom gourmet, unconsciously 
perceiving a parasol mushroom could increase his saliva secretion, and make him prone to 
walk in the mushroom's direction. But assuming that Ned lacks any further knowledge about 
this situation, that is all unconscious perception can afford him. Even if it might prompt 
mushroom-related thoughts in Ned's mind, those would not be about that particular parasol 
mushroom because he is not conscious of it. 
 Given all that, unconscious perceptual warrant is best characterized as limited to 
affecting the subject's conscious thought and behaviour in a manner that makes her prone to 
think about what she is conscious of in some ways rather than another, or to react to what she 
is conscious of in some ways rather than another. Such influences are not instances of 
perceptual knowledge. For knowledge entails success, whereas unconscious perception only 
makes success more probable. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 In the final analysis, the possibility of unconscious perception does not create a 
problem for the conjunction of epistemological disjunctivism and naïve realism. On the 
contrary, it provides a contrast that highlights the epistemic import of perceptual 
consciousness. It is against the background of unconscious perception that we can see and 
appreciate the epistemic import of perceptual consciousness, which is precisely what both 
epistemological disjunctivism and naïve realism were designed to emphasize. 
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